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当前位置:大乐透走势图浙江 > 双语哲学 > 社会契约论 > 第21章 第三卷
第1节 第一章 政府总论 【
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文章摘要:第一章 政府总论 ,志大才疏毛细血管档案资料,挹斗扬箕各种各样口中。

我提醒读者注意:本章必须仔细研读,对于不能用心的人,我是无法讲明白的.
   
    一切自由的行为,都是由两种原因的结合而形成的:一种是精神的原因,亦即决定这种行动的意志;另一种是物理的原因,也是执行这种行动的力量.当我朝着一个目标前进时,第一必须是我想要走到那里去;其次必须是我的脚步能把我带到那里去.一个瘫痪的人想要跑,一个矫捷的人不想跑,这两个人都将停留在原地上.政治体也有同样的动力,我们在这里同样地可以区别力量和意志;后者叫作立法权力,前者叫作行政权力.没有这两者的结合,便不可能或者不应该做出任何事情来.
   
    我们已经看到,立法权力是属于人民的,并且只有属于人民.反之,根据以前所确定的原则也不难看出,行政权力并不能拥有像立法者或主权者那样的普遍性;因为这一权力仅只包括个别的行动,这些个别行动根本不归于法律的能力,从而也就不属于主权者的能力,因为主权者的一切行为都只能是法律.
   
    因此,公共力量就必须有一个合适的代理人来把它结合在一处,并使它按照公意的指示而活动;他可以充当国家与主权者之间的联系,他对公共人格所起的作用极有点像是灵魂与肉体的结合对一个人所起的作用那样.这就是国家之中之所以要有政府的理由;政府和主权者常常被人混淆,其实政府也就是主权者的执行人.
  
    那么,什么是政府呢?政府就是在臣民与主权者之间建立的一个中间体,以便两者得以互相适应,它负责执行法律并维持社会的以及政治的自由.
   
    这一中间体的成员就叫做行政官或者国王,也即是说执政者;而这一整个的中间体则称为君主.所以有人认为人民服从首领时所根据的那种行为绝不是一个契约,这是很有道理的.那完全是一种委托,是一种任命;在那里,他们仅仅是主权者的官吏,是以主权者的名义在行使着主权者所托付给他们的权力,并且只要主权者高兴,他就可以限制.改变和收回这种权力.转让这种权利既然是与社会共同体的本身不相容的,所以也就是违反结合目的的.
   
    因此,我把行政权力的合法运用称之为政府或最高行政,并把这种行政的个人或团体称之为君主或行政官.
   
    正是在政府之中,才能发现中间力量;这些中间力量的比例就构成全体对全体的比例,也就是主权者对国家的比例.我们可以用一个连比例中首尾两项的比率来表示主权者对国家的比例,而连比例的比例中项便是政府.政府从主权者那里接受它向人民所发布的任何命令;并且为了使国家能够处于最佳的平衡状态,就必须......在全盘加以计算之后......使政府自乘的乘积或幂与一方面既是主权者而另一方面又是臣民的公民们的乘积或幂,二者相当.
   
    而且,只要我们变更这三项中的任何一项,就得立刻破坏这个比例.如果主权者想要进行统治;或者,如果行政官想要制订法律;或者,假如臣民拒绝服从;那么,混乱就会代替秩序,力量与意志就不会协调一致,于是国家就会解体而陷入专制政体或是陷入无政府状态.最后,正如在每种比率之间仅仅有一个比例中项,所以一个国家也只能有一种可能的好政府.但是,由于很多种的变故都可以改变一个民族的这些比率,所以不仅各个不同的民族可以有不同的好政府,而且就连同一个民族在不同的时代也可以有好政府.
   
    为了设法解说可能制约着上述首尾两项之间的各种不同的比例,我可以举一种最易于说明的比例为例,即人口的数目.
   
    假设一个国家是由一万名公民组成的.主权者只能集体地并作为共同体来加以考虑的;但是每单个以臣民的资格,则可以认为是个体.于是主权者对臣民就是一万比一,也即是,国家的每一个成员自己的那一部分只拥有主权权威的万分之一,尽管他必须完全服从主权.假设人民是十万人,臣民的情况依然不变,并且所有的人都同等地担负着全部的法律;然而他的表决权已缩减至十万分之一,于是在制订法律时,他的影响也就缩减到原来的十分之一.这时候,臣民始终为一,但主权者的比率则随着公民的人数而增大.由此可知,国家越扩大则自由就越缩小.
   
    我所说比率增大,意思是说它离开平等就愈加遥远了.因此,在几何学的意义上比率愈大,则在通常的意义上比率就愈小:在前一种意义上,比率是从数量来评价的,以商数来衡量的;而在后一种意义上,比率是从相等来的,是以相似值来计算的.
   
    因此,个别意志对公意.也就是说风气对法律的比率越小,则制裁的力量就应该越加大.从而政府若要成为好政府,就应该随着人民数量的增多而相应地加强.
   
    另一方面,既然国家的扩大给予了公共权威的受托者以更多的诱惑和滥用权力的方法;所以越是政府越有力量来约束人民,则主权者这方面也就越应该有力量来约束政府.我这里论述的不是绝对的力量,而是国家各个不同部分相对的力量.
   
    从这个双比率中就可以看出:主权者.君主与人民三者之间的连比决不是一项主观臆造的观念,而是政治体的本性的必然结果.还可以看到:首尾两项中有一项,即作为臣民的人民,既然是一成不变地等于"一";因此,这个双比率每一次增大或者缩小,则单比例也就照样地增大或者缩小,从而中项也就随之而改变.由此可见:并不存在任何一种唯一的绝对的政府体制,而是随着国家大小的变化,也就可以有同样之多的性质不同的政府.
   
    假如有人嘲笑这种体系说:为了能找出这个比例中项并组成政府共同体,依我的办法,只需求出人口数字的平方根就行了;那么,我就要回答,我这里引用人口的数目只是作一个例子,我所说的比率并不能单单以人数来衡量,而是一般地要以结合了大量因素的作用量来衡量的;而且还有,假如我是为了用简显的词句来表达我的观点而暂时借用了几何学的名词,我当然并没有忽视几何学的精确性对于精神方面的数量是完全没有用场的.
  
    政府是那个包括政府本身在内的大型政治共同体的小型化.政府是被赋予一定能力的一个道德人格,它同主权者一样是主动的,又同国家一样是被动的;我们还可以把它再分解成其他类似的比率,由此便又产生了新的比例,其中按执政的等级还可以再有比例;由此下去,直至一个不可再分的中项为止,即,直至一个唯一的首领或者最高行政官为止,他可以被认定是代表这一整个序列之中的分数级数与整数级数之间的"一".
   
    我们无须纠缠于这些罗嗦的名词;只需把政府看做是国家之内的一个新的共同体,区别于人民以及主权者,并且是这两者之间的中间体,这也就够了.
  
    这两种共同体之间有着这种本质的差别,即国家是由于它自身而存在的,但政府则只能是由于主权者而存在的.所以君主的统治意志就只是,或者只应该是公意或法律;他的力量只是集中在他身上的公共力量而已;只要他想使自己获得某种绝对的.独立的行为,整体的联系就会松散.最后,如果君主居然具有了一种比主权者的意志更为活跃的个别意志,并且他竟然使自己所掌握的公共力量揽制于这个个别意志,以致于可以说是有了两个主权者,一个是权利上的,而另一个却是事实上的;这时,社会的结合便会即刻消灭,而政治体也便会即刻解体.
   
    可是,为了使政府共同体能具有一种真正生存,能具有一种与国家共同体截然不同的真正生命,为了使它的全部成员都能共同协作并能适应于创建政府的目的;它就必须有一个单独的"我",有一种为它的全体成员所共存的感情,有一种力量,有一种要求自我保存的固有意志.这种单独的存在就要有大会.内阁会议.审议权与决定权,种种权利和称号以及属于君主所专有的各种特权,并且使行政官的地位随着它的愈加艰巨而成比例地更加尊荣.困难就在于以何种方式在整体之中安排这个附属的整体,从而使它在确定自己的体制时,决不至于变换总的体制,从而使它始终能够区别以保存自身为目的的个别力量和以保存国家为目的的公共力量;从而,总之,使它永远准备着为人民而牺牲政府,而不是为政府而牺牲人民.
   
    然而,尽管政府这个人为共同体是另一个人为共同体的产物,而且在某种形式上还不过具有一种假借的和附属的生命;但是这并不阻碍政府能够以或多或少的生气与敏捷性而行动,并且能说,能够享有或多或少的茁壮的健康.最后,政府虽不直接脱离其创制的目的,却能依照它本身建制的方式而或多或少地偏离这个目的.
   
    由于这一切的不同,便使得政府对于国家共同体所能具有的比例,也要按照国家自身会因之而改变的种种偶然的.特殊的比例而有种种不同.因为往往有自身是最好的政府,但如果随着它所属的政治体的缺点而改变它的比率的话,它就会变成为最坏的政府. 

I WARN the reader that this chapter requires careful reading, and that I am unable to make myself clear to those who refuse to be attentive.
Every free action is produced by the concurrence of two causes; one moral, i.e., the will which determines the act; the other physical, i.e., the power which executes it. When I walk towards an object, it is necessary first that I should will to go there, and, in the second place, that my feet should carry me. If a paralytic wills to run and an active man wills not to, they will both stay where they are. The body politic has the same motive powers; here too force and will are distinguished, will under the name of legislative power and force under that of executive power. Without their concurrence, nothing is, or should be, done.

We have seen that the legislative power belongs to the people, and can belong to it alone. It may, on the other hand, readily be seen, from the,大乐透走势图浙江:principles laid down above, that the executive power cannot belong to the generality as legislature or Sovereign, because it consists wholly of particular acts which fall outside the competency of the law, and consequently of the Sovereign, whose acts must always be laws.

The public force therefore needs an agent of its own to bind it together and set it to work under the direction of the general will, to serve as
a means of communication between the State and the Sovereign, and to do for the collective person more or less what the union of soul and body does for man. Here we have what is, in the State, the basis of government, often wrongly confused with the Sovereign, whose minister it is.

What then is government? An intermediate body set up between the subjects and the Sovereign, to secure their mutual correspondence, charged with the execution of the laws and the maintenance of liberty, both civil and political.

The members of this body are called magistrates or kings, that is to say governors, and the whole body bears the name prince.[18] Thus those who hold that the act, by which a people puts itself under a prince, is not a contract, are certainly right. It is simply and solely a commission, an employment, in which the rulers, mere officials of the Sovereign, exercise in their own name the power of which it makes them depositaries. This power it can limit, modify or recover at pleasure; for the alienation of such a right is incompatible with the nature of the social body, and contrary to the end of association.

I call then government, or supreme administration, the legitimate exercise of the executive power, and prince or magistrate the man or the
body entrusted with that administration.

In government reside the intermediate forces whose relations make up that of the whole to the whole, or of the Sovereign to the State. This
last relation may be represented as that between the extreme terms of a continuous proportion, which has government as its mean proportional. The government gets from the Sovereign the orders it gives the people, and, for the State to be properly balanced, there must, when everything is reckoned in, be equality between the product or power of the government taken in itself, and the product or power of the citizens, who are on the one hand sovereign and on the other subject.

Furthermore, none of these three terms can be altered without the equality being instantly destroyed. If the Sovereign desires to govern,
or the magistrate to give laws, or if the subjects refuse to obey, disorder takes the place of regularity, force and will no longer act
together, and the State is dissolved and falls into despotism or anarchy. Lastly, as there is only one mean proportional between each
relation, there is also only one good government possible for a State. But, as countless events may change the relations of a people, not only may different governments be good for different peoples, but also for the same people at different times.

In attempting to give some idea of the various relations that may hold between these two extreme terms, I shall take as an example the number of a people, which is the most easily expressible.

Suppose the State is composed of ten thousand citizens. The Sovereign can only be considered collectively and as a body; but each member, as being a subject, is regarded as an individual: thus the Sovereign is to the subject as ten thousand to one, i.e., each member of the State has as his share only a ten-thousandth part of the sovereign authority, although he is wholly under its control. If the people numbers a hundred thousand, the condition of the subject undergoes no change, and each equally is under the whole authority of the laws, while his vote, being reduced to a hundred-thousandth part, has ten times less influence in drawing them up. The subject therefore remaining always a unit, therelation between him and the Sovereign increases with the number of the citizens. From this it follows that, the larger the State, the less the liberty.

When I say the relation increases, I mean that it grows more unequal. Thus the greater it is in the geometrical sense, the less relation there
is in the ordinary sense of the word. In the former sense, the relation, considered according to quantity, is expressed by the quotient; in the
latter, considered according to identity, it is reckoned by similarity.

Now, the less relation the particular wills have to the general will, that is, morals and manners to laws, the more should the repressive force be increased. The government, then, to be good, should be proportionately stronger as the people is more numerous.

On the other hand, as the growth of the State gives the depositaries of the public authority more temptations and chances of abusing their
power, the greater the force with which the government ought to be endowed for keeping the people in hand, the greater too should be the
force at the disposal of the Sovereign for keeping the government in hand. I am speaking, not of absolute force, but of the relative force of the different parts of the State.

It follows from this double relation that the continuous proportion between the Sovereign, the prince and the people, is by no means an arbitrary idea, but a necessary consequence of the nature of the body politic. It follows further that, one of the extreme terms, viz., the people, as subject, being fixed and represented by unity, whenever the duplicate ratio increases or diminishes, the simple ratio does the same, and is changed accordingly. From this we see that there is not a single unique and absolute form of government, but as many governments differing in nature as there are States differing in size.

If, ridiculing this system, any one were to say that, in order to find the mean proportional and give form to the body of the government, it is
only necessary, according to me, to find the square root of the number of the people, I should answer that I am here taking this number only as an instance; that the relations of which I am speaking are not measured by the number of men alone, but generally by the amount of action, which is a combination of a multitude of causes; and that, further, if, to save words, I borrow for a moment the terms of geometry, I am none the less well aware that moral quantities do not allow of geometrical accuracy.

The government is on a small scale what the body politic which includes it is on a great one. It is a moral person endowed with certain faculties, active like the Sovereign and passive like the State, and capable of being resolved into other similar relations. This accordingly
gives rise to a new proportion, within which there is yet another, according to the arrangement of the magistracies, till an indivisible middle term is reached, i.e., a single ruler or supreme magistrate, who may be represented, in the midst of this progression, as the unity between the fractional and the ordinal series.

Without encumbering ourselves with this multiplication of terms, let us rest content with regarding government as a new body within the State, distinct from the people and the Sovereign, and intermediate between them.

There is between these two bodies this essential difference, that the State exists by itself, and the government only through the Sovereign.
Thus the dominant will of the prince is, or should be, nothing but the general will or the law; his force is only the public force concentrated in his hands, and, as soon as he tries to base any absolute and independent act on his own authority, the tie that binds the whole together begins to be loosened. If finally the prince should come to have a particular will more active than the will of the Sovereign, and should employ the public force in his hands in obedience to this particular will, there would be, so to speak, two Sovereigns, one rightful and the other actual, the social union would evaporate instantly, and the body politic would be dissolved.

However, in order that the government may have a true existence and a real life distinguishing it from the body of the State, and in order that all its members may be able to act in concert and fulfil the end for which it was set up, it must have a particular personality, a sensibility common to its members, and a force and will of its own making for its preservation. This particular existence implies assemblies, councils, power and deliberation and decision, rights, titles, and privileges belonging exclusively to the prince and making the office of magistrate more honourable in proportion as it is more troublesome. The difficulties lie in the manner of so ordering this subordinate whole within the whole, that it in no way alters the general constitution by affirmation of its own, and always distinguishes the particular force it possesses, which is destined to aid in its preservation, from the public force, which is destined to the preservation of the State; and, in a word, is always ready to sacrifice the government to the people, and never to sacrifice the people to the government.

Furthermore, although the artificial body of the government is the work of another artificial body, and has, we may say, only a borrowed and
subordinate life, this does not prevent it from being able to act with more or less vigour or promptitude, or from being, so to speak, in more
or less robust health. Finally, without departing directly from the end for which it was instituted, it may deviate more or less from it, according to the manner of its constitution.

From all these differences arise the various relations which the government ought to bear to the body of the State, according to the accidental and particular relations by which the State itself is modified, for often the government that is best in itself will become the most pernicious, if the relations in which it stands have altered according to the defects of the body politic to which it belongs.

legislative,generality,certainly,concurrence,countless,incompatible,execution,magistrate


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